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Abstract
Background: We study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on two social networks substrates obtained from actual
relational data.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We find very different cooperation levels on each of them that cannot be easily
understood in terms of global statistical properties of both networks. We claim that the result can be understood at the
mesoscopic scale, by studying the community structure of the networks. We explain the dependence of the cooperation
level on the temptation parameter in terms of the internal structure of the communities and their interconnections. We then
test our results on community-structured, specifically designed artificial networks, finding a good agreement with the
observations in both real substrates.
Conclusion: Our results support the conclusion that studies of evolutionary games on model networks and their
interpretation in terms of global properties may not be sufficient to study specific, real social systems. Further, the study
allows us to define new quantitative parameters that summarize the mesoscopic structure of any network. In addition, the
community perspective may be helpful to interpret the origin and behavior of existing networks as well as to design
structures that show resilient cooperative behavior.
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Introduction
The emergence and survival of cooperation in adverse environ
ments has been, for a long time, a challenging problem for scholars
in disciplines as diverse as biology, sociology or economics [1 3].
While some partial answers have been advanced in the last forty
years [4], cooperation among unrelated individuals is far from
understood. Social dilemmas, situations in which individual
rationality leads to situations in which everyone is worse off, are a
prominent example of this conundrum [5]. Within the general
framework of evolutionary game theory, which is particularly well
suited to study this problem, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a
paradigmatic setting to capture the paradox of altruism persistence
against short term benefits of egoism. In this game two players
choose between cooperation (C) or defection (D), the payoffs for the
two actions being as shown in the following (Table 1).
Relations between different possible payoffs follow the rule
b.1.e.0, that immediately poses the dilemma: While the
rational choice is to defect, it leads to a highly inefficient outcome
as compared to that obtained by two cooperators. In other words,
a decision that should be good for the individual leads to a poor
result from the global (group, social) viewpoint. This is the most
stringent social dilemma in so far as to defect is a dominant
strategy: ‘‘Softer’’ dilemmas (stag hunt, snowdrift [5]) require to
coordinate or anti coordinate with the other player’s choice, but
there is not a dominant option. We focus here on the PD because
it represents the situation in which cooperation is more difficult
and, therefore, its origin and stability is more problematic.
Among the plethora of studies devoted to this issue, a
particularly important and fruitful one is the modeling of the
population as a set of non rational, learning agents that interact
locally [6 11] (see [12] for a very recent review). Locality is
introduced in the model through a network on which agents are
placed. These agents then play the game only with their neighbors
(in neighborhoods that can be defined in different ways) instead of
interacting with all other agents. Learning is introduced through
imitation: after a round of games has been carried through
the whole lattice, agents look at their neighbors and choose the
strategy that has led to the highest payoff before proceeding to the
next round of games. With these two ingredients, namely locality
and imitation, it is generally observed [6,11,13] that states in
which a sizeable part of the population cooperates emerge (at least
for values of b not too close to 2), the mechanism for this
emergence being the formation of clusters of cooperators that can
successfully outcompete defectors.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether this mechanism for
the emergence of cooperation appears also in real social networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 4 | e1892
[14]. As a first step to answer this question, some authors have
focused their interest on the influence of certain macroscopic
structural features that have been observed in real networks on the
evolution of cooperation, such as the small world phenomenon
[15] or the scale free character of the degree distribution [16]. A
general conclusion of this research is that the inhomogeneity of the
degree distribution plays a central role on this issue, and that it
may favor the emergence of cooperation. However, none of these
studies deals either with true social network substrates or with
more specific mesoscopic structures, in particular, the community
structure present in many real social networks. The motivation on
the use of real social substrates relies on the fact that these
networks present structural characteristics that are often not
reproduced by general network models. Although it is true that
real social network structures must be a particular instance of all
possible synthetic cases, instead of exploring the myriad of
possibilities within the model space, it seems more convenient to
use real social networks to get insight as to which structural
features one should look at for advancing in the understanding of
the evolution of cooperation.
To our knowledge, there is only one paper about the PD on real
social networks [17], but its point of view is dynamical and
unrelated to the present one. Therefore, our research is a first
attempt to understand the relevance of considering empirical
social networks as a topological support for the local interactions in
the framework of imitation models. The analysis of the results
allows us to claim that it is mandatory to consider structural
features of networks at the mesoscale (basically its community
structure) to understand the arising of cooperation. We also
propose a model network construction algorithm that synthetizes
different mesoscopic structures into networks, and that allows
crosschecking this claim on in silico substrates. Furthermore, the
model can be used to build networks with specific cooperative
properties, which can later be employed in the design of
organizations. We have thus completed a research cycle going
from the observation of the behavior of cooperation on real
networks to the modelling and application of our conclusions
through the identification of the most relevant features of the
problem.
Materials and Methods
Datasets
For our research we have used two social substrates obtained by
sampling real relational data. We have chosen these substrates
instead of other social network data available, such as the IMDB
network for actor collaboration in movies or the scientific
collaborating networks, because their links are defined through
true personal exchanges. In contrast, these other public data are
bipartite networks, where links are defined by joining the
collaboration framework (movies, research projects, articles, etc.)
which does not necessarily imply mutual interactions. Our first
substrate is a social network obtained from the email traffic
between members of University Rovira i Virgili (in Tarragona,
Spain; email network from now on), where nodes represent
individual email addresses and undirected links between two nodes
indicate bidirectional communication (at least one email in each
direction) [18]. Our second real social substrate consists of nodes
representing users of the ‘‘Pretty Good Privacy’’ encryption
algorithm (PGP network, from now on), while links trace trust
relationships between those persons who sign each other’s public
keys [19]. For a comparison of some of their statistical properties
see Table 2.
Dynamics
Our simulations of the PD over all the networks (both email and
PGP, as well as on the models to be introduced below) follow
strictly the rules in [6,8], namely:
N Initial strategies of agents are assigned randomly with the same
probability to be C or D (we have checked that other choices
for the initial fraction of C or D lead to similar results, see
Figure S1).
N The game is played between each pair of neighbors, and
payoffs are accrued according to b.1, and e 0 although we
checked that its value (being small, e.g. 0.01) does not affect the
results, see Figure S2.
N Accumulated payoffs of all agents are computed by adding up
the results of the games with their neighbors in the present
turn.
N In the next round, every agent imitates the strategy of the most
successful agent in her neighborhood (randomly selected if
there are two or more agents with the same payoff), after which
payoffs are reset to zero.
While the networks we use are obtained from experimental
measurements and, as such, are given, there are different options
for the learning rule of the agents we place on the network. We
chose to stick to the (unconditional) imitation rule described above
for a a number of reasons. From the methodological viewpoint,
imitation allows a direct comparison to other studies, such as [6,8]
while, on the other hand, its deterministic character makes its
numerical study much more amenable. Importantly, for global
interactions learning by imitation ends up in global defection, and
hence cooperation in a local model can not be due solely to this
learning rule. From the theoretical viewpoint, it is clear that other
rules, such as best reply, will lead straightforwardly to a fully
defecting population even with local interactions. It can be argued
that imitation is too simple a rule but, as discussed in [9], there are
Table 2. Statistical properties of e-mail and PGP networks.
Network Ref. N P(k) ÆCæ r
email [18] 1133 ,exp ( k/9.2) 0.25 0.078
PGP [19] 10680 ,k ‘( 2.63) if k,40 0.26 0.238
,k ‘( 4.0) if k.40
N is the number of nodes of the giant component of the network considering
only those links that are bidirectional (indicating mutual acquaintance between
nodes). P(k) is the degree distribution, i.e., the histogram of the number of
nodes with a give degree k (analytical expressions are best fits to the data using
least squares method). ÆCæ is the average clustering coefficient and indicates the
fraction of existing triangles between each node and its neighbours in the
network, and r stands for the assortativity coefficient, that measures the
tendency of nodes of high degree to link between them, r.0, or with nodes of
lower degree, r,0 [43].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.t002
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
C D
C 1 0
D b e
Payoffs received by the row player when plays against the strategy in the
column. The relation among the payoffs is: b.1.e.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.t001
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several reasons why agents may fail to recognize they are in a
dilemma situation, which would lead them to defection; another
reason for the use of imitation is as a mode of economizing
behavior [20]. From the experimental viewpoint, there are several
reports that indicate that imitation is commonly used by humans
[21 23]. Finally, imitation can be justified in psychological terms
by looking at how confirmation and disconfirmation of beliefs are
carried out [24] and has been also proposed as a relevant force to
drive the evolution towards economic equilibrium [25]. Specific
aspects where the use of other learning mechanisms can change
our results will be discussed below (see Conclusions).
Finally, we note that the update rule for strategies is
synchronous, i.e., all agents update their strategy at the same
time, proceeding to a new round of the game subsequently.
Changing to a non synchronous update is known to have non
trivial consequences [7,26]. However, non synchronicity is difficult
to deal with in general, as the particular way to introduce it comes
dictated by the application of interest and different procedures
lead to different results; that is why it has been considered only
rarely in the framework of evolutionary game theory, and only in
very simple and arguably arbitrary ways [7,8]. Note also that the
rule is based on the total payoff accumulated by every player,
which obviously makes hubs more influential than nodes with very
few links. One could think of using the average payoff (i.e., the
payoff divided by the degree). While this choice would make nodes
more equivalent, it requires the players to be aware of very much
information about their neighbors, and this information is more
difficult to obtain than the absolute payoff (or some estimate of it).
Results
Let us begin by examining the results of simulations of the PD
on real social networks as a function of the temptation parameter
b. In Fig. 1 we plot the final density of cooperators on the two cases
addressed here, the email network and the PGP network. The first
remarkable feature of these plots is the high level of cooperation
attained even for large values of b on both networks, as compared
to the results on regular lattices [6,8,11] with the same imitation
dynamics. The cooperation levels are not as high as those reported
by Santos et al. [16,27,28] on scale free networks, although in their
simulations the dynamics is stochastic, and therefore a direct
comparison can not be made. In this regard we also want to stress
that the two networks we are analyzing can not be considered
scale free: The email network has a clear exponential distribution
of degrees, and the PGP network presents two regions with a clear
crossover from a power law behavior with exponents 2.63 (for
degree k,40) and 4 (for degree k.40) strongly indicating a
bounded degree distribution.
Nevertheless, the crucial result arising from Fig. 1 is that the
dependence of the level of cooperation on the temptation
parameter b is very different for both networks. As we may see
from the plots, the cooperation level on the email network is a
decreasing function of b, going from values very close to
unanymous cooperation for b<1, to about a 15% for b close to
2. On the contrary, the PGP network presents an almost constant
cooperation level, with a variation of a 10% at most in all the
range of b values, except for b 2. These results inmediately lead
to the conclusion that there is no typical behavior of the
cooperation level on true social networks, at least in the framework
of the PD with imitation dynamics or learning.
The above conclusion is further reinforced by noting that the
cooperation level in each network changes in a very different
manner when their original structure is distorted. To this end, we
have compared the results on the two networks with their
randomized version preserving the degree of each node, carried
out through a rewiring process [29]. The process, that consists of
repeatedly choosing at random two nodes and exchanging one
neighbor of each node (also selected randomly), destroys
correlations between nodes (and in particular the community
structure we will discuss below). Figure 1 shows clearly that playing
the game on the real networks and on their randomized versions
gives rise to opposite behaviors: On the email network cooperation
reaches extremal values, higher than the random case when b is
close to 1, and lower when b is close to its maximum limit of 2. On
the contrary, on the PGP network cooperation is higher on the
random version for low values of the temptation b, and worse for
higher values. Remarkably, the cooperation level in the random
versions of the two networks is very similar, and close to those
reported in [27] for the configuration (random) model, although it
must be kept in mind that the dynamics is different in the latter
case; interestingly, this does not seem to induce large differences in
behavior in this respect.
Our two examples, email and PGP, do not seem to fit in any of
the categories previously reported in the literature for the behavior
of the PD, which implies that the macroscopic (global, statistical)
similarities between both topologies (see Table 2) are not
Figure 1. Evolution of cooperation in real social networks. Black lines: Density of cooperators as a function of b, obtained by numerical
simulations on the email (left) and PGP (right) networks. Red lines: Density of cooperators on random networks generated from the original ones by a
rewiring procedure that preserves the degree distribution(see text). The equilibrium densities of cooperators have been obtained by averaging 500
generations, after a transient time of 750 generation steps. Each point corresponds to an average over 1000 independent simulations with 50%
cooperators and defectors as the initial condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.g001
Mesostructure and Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 4 | e1892
determinant for the opposite behaviors observed. Furthermore,
the fact that randomization, while preserving the degree
distribution, drives the behavior of the two networks to the same
general pattern, indicates that neither the whole network nor
individual agents provide the clue to understanding our observa
tions. Therefore, in order to gain insight on this problem, we must
consider an intermediate, mesoscopic organizational level as the
possible source of the explanation for the dramatic differences
observed in the original systems. This in turn requires a deeper
analysis of the structure of both networks, which is what we
subsequently do.
Communities
As a first attempt to understand networks at a mesoscopic level,
we propose to focus on their community structure. Community
structure is a common feature of many networks: Communities
can be qualitatively defined as subgraphs with dense connections
within themselves and sparser ones between them. A quantitative
definition of communities is introduced as the partition of a
network that optimizes the quality function known as modularity:
Q~
P
r err a
2
r
 
where err are the fraction of links that connect
two nodes inside the community r, ar the fraction of links that have
one or both vertices inside the community r, and the sum extends
to all communities r in a given network [30]. The modularity of a
given partition is then the probability of having edges falling within
groups in the network minus the expected probability in an
equivalent (null case) network with the same number of nodes, and
edges placed at random preserving the nodes’ degree. There exist
many other ways to introduce the concept of community that can
be found in the literature of social sciences [14], we have chosen
modularity for being a global observable proposed in the physics
literature with a large success in the identification of known sub
structure in networks.
Among the wide variety of algorithms available to carry out this
maximization process [31], we used a divisive algorithm proposed
by one of the authors based on Extremal Optimization (EO)
heuristics [32]. A detailed description of the method is beyond the
scope of the paper, but full details can be found elsewhere [33].
Any other algorithm to optimize modularity can be used, provided
the optimal values of modularity found are competitive.
Once we have determined the number and size of the network
communities, we focus on the study of two structural mesoscopic
characteristics: The connectivity between communities and their
internal organization.
Inter-community structure
To summarize the results obtained from a community analysis
of both social networks and to facilitate their comparison, the
outcome of our analysis is jointly presented in Figure 2 (A and B for
the email and PGP, respectively). Each node corresponds to a
community, and a link between two nodes denotes cross relations.
In addition, the size of nodes and links gives information about
community size and number of cross links, respectively. It is
evident from the plot that communities in the email network
are densely interconnected, and sparsely interconnected in the
PGP network. The calculation of the weighted degree distribution
(the distribution of the sums of weights of links for each node)
P(v) confirms this evidence: the email community network has
a P vð Þ : e{av2 while the PGP community network presents a
P(v) : e bv.
Intra-community structure
The internal structure of communities in both networks also
presents important differences. In Fig. 2C and Fig. 2D we plot the
aspect of representative communities of the email and PGP
networks, respectively. From the plot, the differences in the
Figure 2. Community structures of the email and PGP networks. Top: Community structures of the email (A) and PGP (B) networks. Nodes
correspond to communities (where size is proportional to their number of members) and links represent cross connections (where width corresponds
to the number of inter connetions). Bottom: Typical examples of the communities detected in the email (C) and PGP (D) networks. Solid links join
nodes of the community, dashed links join this community with others.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.g002
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internal structure are clear: the email communities present a very
homogeneous structure when compared with the heterogeneity of
the PGP communities. For a more quantitative assesment of this
difference, we have calculated the relative difference between the
average and the maximum value of the internal degree in each
community, DH. This measure allows to grasp the heterogeneity of
the internal community structure. While DH : 5 in the email
network, the values of DH in the PGP network range from 5 up to
35, confirming our observations. In the following, we will call local
hubs the nodes in the PGP networks responsible for the very high
DH<30.
Hypothesis
Previous works have stressed the role of hubs at a macroscopical
level in PD dynamics on adaptive networks [3 37]. Although our
networks are static, it is expected that the presence of these local
hubs in PGP communities (as well as their absence in the email
ones) influences strongly the evolution of the PD on these
networks. To be specific, local hubs play a double stabilizing role:
First, as most nodes in the community are directly linked to their
local hub, the whole community tends to imitate the strategy of the
hub; second, when a less connected member of the community
changes her strategy following an external node, the influence of
the local hub makes it harder for this strategy to spread to the
whole community.
On the contrary, homogeneous internal degree distributions, as
in the case of the email network, lead to a behavior that is not
governed by hubs: All nodes are more or less equivalent, and
indeed simulations show that their strategies evolve in a
synchronized manner, at least to some degree. Therefore, the
behavior of the email network will be more dependent on how the
communities are connected among themselves. We thus are in a
position to formulate our hypothesis: the behavior observed in a
network with communities depends strongly on the intra
community heterogeneity (IH) and on the inter community
connectivity (IC). In this scenario, the robustness of cooperation
observed in the PGP network is due to its low IC and high IH,
whereas the fact that cooperation only arises for low b in the email
network arises from its high IC and low IH.
Discussion
Test of our hypothesis in model networks
As we have seen, the analysis of the email and PGP networks
raised two characteristic patterns of the mesoscale: (i) IH, or
existence or not of local hubs in the network (Intra Heterogeneity),
and (ii) IC, the degree of connections between communities (Inter
Connectivity). To test this hypothesis, we propose to use synthetic
networks as a benchmark in which to tune the above mechanisms
as follows:
N First we divide a number of nodes N, into m communities of
equivalent size.
N Second, we prescribe the IH. We have used as standard
mechanisms for the construction of ad hoc homogeneous and
heterogeneous communities the Erdos Renyi model [38] and
the heterogeneous (scale free) random graph resulting from the
Barabasi Albert model [39], respectively. In the first case the
probability of connection between two nodes is constant
(pintra); in the second case, the network grows by adding nodes
with k0 links to an initial connected core, and the probability of
connection of a node i to another existing node j is
proportional to the current degree of node j.
N Third, we prescribe the IC. We construct a unique connected
component by linking the communities previously generated.
To interconnect the resulting communities we prescribe a new
constant probability pinter to form links between two randomly
selected nodes from the pool of communities, whenever these
nodes below to different communities. The density of cross
connections is controlled by the probability pinter. Note that pinter
must be sufficiently large to ensure the existence ofa unique
connected component, but not so high as to mask the actual
communities (i.e. an accurate detection algorithm should still
separate the prescribed communities).
N Finally, we check by using a community detection algorithm
(extremal optimization [33]) that the communities obtained at
the best partition of modularity are the prescribed ones.
We have built up four statistically significant synthetic test
networks with the same number of nodes (N 10000) and the
same number of communities (m 75), corresponding to four
extremal configurations corresponding to the combination of low
and high values of the IH and IC. Our expectation is that the
configuration corresponding to low IH and high IC will be
representative of the class of mesoscopic traits observed in the
email network; conversely, high IH and low IC should be
representative of the class of mesoscopic traits observed in the PGP
network. The other two cases, low IH and low IC, and high IH
and high IC should constitute intermediate configurations between
the former ones. The statistical properties of the so obtained
networks are listed in Table 3.
At this point, we want to emphasize that the statistical properties
of the email and PGP networks (Table 2) and their synthetic
counterparts (cases A and D in Table 3) present strong
dissimilarities. First, we notice that the degree distributions of
the synthetic networks are different from those observed in real
networks. In addition, the clustering coefficient of the synthetic
networks is almost an order of magnitude smaller than in the real
networks. Finally, the assortativity coefficient of the synthetic class
with low IC is negative, while the other two present positive values
of assortativity. These different statistical properties of our
synthetic and empirical networks are specially interesting for the
validation process: Since the list of similarities between the two
sets of networks has been reduced to the desired inter and
intracommunity structural properties, any agreement we may find
on the behavior of cooperation dynamics can be safely attributed
to these mesoscopic features.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of cooperation as a function of the
temptation parameter b for our four synthetic networks. We
Table 3. Statistical properties of synthetic networks with
10000 nodes and 75 communities.
Class P(k) ÆCæ r
A (Low IH High IC) ,exp ( 0.0018k2) 0.031 0.013
B (Low IH Low IC) ,k ‘( 2.47) if k,30 0.040 0.202
,k ‘( 0.047k) if k.30
C (High IH High IC) ,exp ( 0.003k2) 0.080 0.110
D (High IH Low IC) ,k ‘( 2.38) if k,30 0.090 0.308
,k ‘( 0.027k) if k.30
P(k) is the degree distribution (best fit to the data using least squares method),
ÆCæ is the clustering coefficient, and r stands for the assortativity coefficient [43].
See definition of these statistical descriptors in Table 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.t003
Mesostructure and Cooperation
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2008 | Volume 3 | Issue 4 | e1892
discuss first the behavior of networks corresponding to A and D
configurations (the synthetic classes of the empirical email and PGP
networks, respectively). Although, in general, the values of final
density of cooperators are smaller than those reached in the
empirical cases (see Figure 1), synthetic networks reproduce the
qualitative behaviors of the two real social networks in terms of
sensitivity to changes of the temptation value b. Actually, the
evolution of cooperation on the synthetic networks presents the
observed tendencies even more emphasized than the empirical
ones. On the one hand, all values of density of cooperators in case
D (PGP class) are close to the density established as initial fraction
of cooperators (r 0.5), revealing extraordinarily high levels of
stability of the strategies played by agents. On the other hand, the
decrease on the cooperation level shown in case A (email class) is
somewhat larger than that of the empirical email network for the
same range of temptation values.
Additional plots in Fig. 3 help us to understand, separately, how
each mesoscopic characteristic acts over cooperation. Comparing
the behavior of configurations A and D with the other two classes,
B and C, we observe that when both mesoscopic characteristics
are high (configuration B), the system presents remarkable rates of
cooperation. On the other hand, for low values of both mesoscopic
characteristics (configuration C) the sensitivity to the temptation
parameter is increased, the maximum level of cooperation is
smaller, and the decay on cooperation is sharper. Consequently,
we observe that IH seems to be more determinant than IC as a
stabilizing factor against changes on the temptation to defect. We
interpret this fact in agreement with macroscopic observations in
scale free networks where hubs play essentially this role [28]. In
our mesoscopic description, a high IH always implies the existence
of ‘‘local hubs’’, that are hubs with respect to the rest of members
of the community although they are not necessarily hubs at a
global scale. These local hubs are the key nodes on which the
robustness of the cooperative behavior relies and correspondingly
IH is the magnitude informing of their existence. Conversely, IC is
more relevant to achieve a larger level of cooperation than IH.
Interestingly, if IC is set to zero, we end up with a set of
disconnected networks where the level of cooperation will always
be lower than if we connect the groups; this can be viewed as a
positive reinforcement of cooperation between groups (communi
ties). It is then clear that the behaviors observed on the email and
PGP empirical networks (and on their synthetic counterparts) is
the result of the interplay of both mesoscopic structural properties,
since we cannot reach case D from case A by tuning only one of
them.
For practical purposes, the computation of the value of IC and
IH can be done a posteriori once the community structure of the
network is obtained, the logical steps to their computation are
then: i) Extract the community structure of the network using
algorithms devised to this end (the more accurate its determination
the more realible the values of IC and IH), ii) compute IC as the
density of cross connections between communities, and iii)
compute IH as the average of the variance of the normalized
degree whitin each community. A more detailed description of this
procedure, including an example with a simple network (Figure
S3), can be found in Text S1. We have tested this procedure on
both our real networks and our synthetic models with quite
satisfactory results. The values obtained using this procedure are
collected in Table S1. Details on the procedure and an example of
its application to a simple graph can be found in the
Figure 3. Evolution of cooperation in four synthetic networks. Cases A and D correspond, respectively, to the synthetic classes of networks
akin to the email and PGP real networks. In case A communities have been built as Erdos Renyi random graphs (pintra = 1.5610
1), and the probability
of interconnection between communities (pinter) is 5610
2. Communities in case D are constructed as independent scale free networks (Barabasi
Albert with k0 = 3), and after they have been sparsely interconnected with (pinter = 1.5610
5). Case B has been obtained from D by increasing the
probability pinter to 3.5610
4, and case C corresponds to A reducing this probability to 7.5610 4. Simulations have been performed as indicated in
Fig. 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.g003
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Supplementary text. It is important to note that the two quantities
we introduce can be computed for any graph and are therefore a
systematic way to obtain quantitative information about its
mesoscopic properties.
Conclusions
In this work we have addressed the issue of the emergence of
cooperation on true social networks in the framework of the
evolutionary PD with imitation. Our results on two different
networks show clearly that the specific details of the network
considered are very relevant to determine the level of cooperation
reached. Our analysis of the community structure of both
networks lead us to the hypothesis that two mesoscopic structural
properties (the connectivity between communities, IC, and their
internal structure, IH) influence the evolution of cooperation in
social networks by raising or lowering the level of cooperation and
the stability of the behavior of the communities against changes on
the temptation to defect. In order to verify this claim, we have
designed synthetic model networks where these two features can
be tuned as desired. Simulations on four such synthetic networks
confirmed that, though their structural features have little in
common with the empirical ones, except for the mesoscopic
characteristics under study, the behavior of cooperation is very
similar. Our models also show that both mesoscopic structural
characteristics, IH and IC, influence the robustness of cooperation
against changes on the temptation to defect, in excellent
agreement with the observation made in the real social networks
analyzed. Finally, we have introduced a procedure to obtain these
two quantities quantitatively from any network.
We stress that, as stated in the introduction, our results combine
two ingredients: locality (given by the network) and learning by
imitation. In this paper we focus on the network structure and find
uncontestable evidence of the relevance of IH and IC on the
dynamics given by our update rule, unconditional imitation. This
is enough to claim that network structure has to be taken into
account in general, as aggregate characteristics may not give clues
to understanding their behavior. However, we realize that the
question then arises as to the influence of these network features on
other dynamics. A thorough study of this issue is beyond the
present work, because evolutionary game theory on graphs
depends very strongly on the specific rule considered, and there
are very many different choices [11 13]. In the case of the
networks studied here, it is important to have in mind that
unconditional imitation leads to lower levels of cooperation [13]
than the stochastic rule used in [16] (proportional update). On the
other hand, hubs have been shown recently to play a role similar
to the one discussed here under such a proportional update
dynamics [37]. To verify that our results are not an artifact of the
imitation rule, we have repeated our simulations with proportional
update. The results are qualitatively the same, the decrease in
cooperation being more abrupt for the email network and
somewhat steeper for the PGP network, but the simulations are
much more demanding because it takes much longer to reach a
steady state. Therefore, while a detailed comparison of these (and
other) rules would require considerable computational effort, we
can at least be sure that the general scenario we are describing will
apply to proportional update. On the other hand, best response
type rules lead, generally speaking, to the same outcome as well
mixed populations [13], and it is clear that in that case the network
structure might control the time to reach asymptotics, but not the
final state itself. In any event, it is clear that this issue deserves
further and thorough study.
Dwelling further on the evolutionary perspective, the work
by Eguı´luz et al. [3] indicates that if the network is allowed to
co evolve with the strategies, a network with hubs develops.
Interestingly, in this network with hubs, the cooperation level
shows similar dependence on the temptation parameter, much as
we have found here for the PGP network. Along similar lines,
recent work by Santos et al. [36,40] suggests a connection between
the emergence of cooperation and the evolutionary appearance of
degree heterogeneity. In this context, our study, which we stress is
carried out on static networks, suggests that the cooperation levels
we observe in the PD may be related to the different origin of the
two networks: While the PGP network is spontaneously formed
and with a clearly cooperative goal in mind (namely, finding help
to ensure communication privacy), the email network arises from
an underlying external structure, whose main purpose is not so
clearly cooperative as it involves many other aspects and tasks.
Our results would then support the existence of community
structures organized around hubs with resilient cooperative
behavior.
The above comment suggests, in addition, that our results may
be of interest for the design of hierarchies and organizations with
tailored cooperation behavior. We have seen that the email
network reaches, for moderate values of the temptation parameter,
cooperation levels very close to the optimum. Therefore, networks
with this structure should be used in order to achieve very high
performance levels in terms of cooperation. On the other hand,
while the email network is quite susceptible to an increase of the
temptation parameter, and hence exhibits a degrading of the
cooperation for large temptations, the PGP network, with its
weakly connected communities with hubs, is much more robust in
this respect, and ensures cooperation for almost any temptation.
Organizations with a PGP like structure would exhibit a very
robust cooperation, although there would always be defectors. In
connection with this, it is important to note that our social
networks are obtained by looking at bidirectional links, which may
be related to an a priori willingness to cooperate among the linked
individuals. This may be an important ingredient for the design of
cooperative networks and a hint towards the understanding of
cooperation. Further research at the mesoscopic scale, looking at
different combinations of IH and IC structures, could lead to
designs that would be both optimal and robust (such as, e.g., the
structure corresponding to Fig. 3B). Interestingly, this conclusion
may carry over to different dynamical contexts (other than
evolutionary game theory): For instance, recent results on
synchronization dynamics in a system of coupled oscillators show
a strong influence of the community structure as well [41], and
hence communities have to be taken into account much in the
same way we are describing here. On the other hand, an
intriguing issue is the connection of our results to the problem of
the evolutionary origin of cooperation. One of the explanations
suggested in this framework is the relevant role of group selection
(see, e.g., [42] and references therein). In this context, the
possibility of making a connection between communities and
group like entities seems very appealing, and is certainly a topic
worth pursuing.
Finally, we want to emphasize our main conclusion, namely that
cooperation in real social networks is a complex issue depending
on the combination of the effects of several structural features.
This result has far reaching implications: Thus, several previous
researches have considered how cooperation emerges in the PD on
different model networks, including gaussian, scale free and small
world ones as paradigms of social networks. There are two main
differences between our work and those previous ones: first, the
cooperation level is in general higher that in the model networks,
and second, results are very different for similar global parameters
of the network due to the influence of the community structure,
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often undetected by global measurements. It is then clear that any
approximation to the evolution of cooperation in social networks
based on the generalization of only one of these structural features
is far too simplistic and may be misleading. Although, as stated in
the introduction, we are studying here the hardest social dilemma,
we envisage that similar conclusions may apply to the other
dilemmas represented by coordination or anti coordination games,
as arguments based on the inter and intra structure of the
communities may well carry over to them. In any event, we believe
that subsequent studies on these issues should then be carried out
on a case by case basis, and should involve a careful analysis at a
mesoscopic (community) level, trying to find out whether
behaviors can be predicted or classified in classes attending to
this structure.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Sensitivity to different initial conditions. For both the
two empirical networks under study (email and PGP), the plots
show the final density of cooperators as ain function of b for
different initial proportions of cooperators (Co). Plots in black
(Co 0.5) correspond to the results shown in Fig. 1. Significantly,
the PGP network presents a more stablegeneric behavior for a
wide range of initial scenarios ranging from Co 0.3 to Co 0.7,
supporting the robustness of the results reported in the paper. The
equilibrium densities of cooperators have been obtained by
averaging 500 generations, after a transient time of 750 generation
steps. Each point has been averaged over 1000 independent
simulations.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.s001 (1.72 MB
DOC)
Figure S2 Sensitivity to positive values of the Punishment (P)
payoff. For two networks corresponding to configurations A and D
(the synthetic classes of the empirical substrates), the plots show the
density of cooperators in as a function of b obtained using two
alternative definitions ofdifferent sets of payoffs for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Black lines correspond to simulations preserving
with the game definitionsame payoffs as in the paper (T b, R 1,
P S 0), while red lines stand for a definition with a positive P
value (T b, R 1, P 0.01, S 0). We observe that the results
presented in the paper do not change significantly when P.0, i.e.,
when we are in the pure Prisoner’s Dilemma and away from its
boundary with the Snowdrift game (corresponding to P,0). The
equilibrium densities of cooperators have been obtained by
averaging 500 generations, after a transient time of 750 generation
steps. Each point corresponds to an average over 1000
independent simulations with 50% cooperators and defectors as
the initial condition.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.s002 (8.96 MB TIF)
Figure S3 Toy model network to illustrate the computation of
IH and IC. In Text S1, we use this network to provide a simple
example of quantification of IH and IC. Dashed lines correspond
to cross links between the two different communities.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.s003 (0.73 MB TIF)
Table S1 Values of IH (Intra community Heterogeneity) and IC
(Inter community Connectivity) for all the networks used in the
manuscript (both empirical and synthetic). The procedure
followed to obtain these quantities is explained in Text S1. These
values confirm quantitatively what was already expressed
qualitatively along the text: On one side, email communities are
less heterogeneous and more densely interconnected than PGP
ones. On the other side, the synthetic networks (and, particularly,
configurations A and D), represent extreme cases.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.s004 (0.05 MB
DOC)
Text S1 Procedures to compute Intra community Heterogeneity
(IH) and Inter community Connectivity (IC).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001892.s005 (0.16 MB
PDF)
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